David Mackie, del Economic Research Global Data Watch de JPMorgan, ha publicado hoy mismo una interesante reflexión sobre aspectos técnicos y de las consecuencias de una inminente salida de Grecia del sistema Target2, lo cual significa de facto el aislamiento financiero y la salida del Euro inmediata.
Si el Siriza (partido de la izquierda radical) gana las elecciones y forma gobierno en Grecia -algo muy factible-, posiblemente diga que no quiere salir del Euro de primeras para no romper la baraja antes de que le permitan sentarse a jugar. Pero si luego cumple sus promesas de declarar una moratoria de la deuda y romper el programa con la Troika, será el BCE el que tenga que tomar la decisión definitiva de sacarles del Euro (sería el que técnicamente apretaría el botón de expulsión). Se necesitaría una votación con una mayoría del 2/3 en el consejo del BCE para cerrarles el acceso al sistema Target2, cerrándoles la entrada al sistema de pagos y no aceptando operaciones de los bancos Griegos. En ese momento los Euros Griegos ya no serían Euros, o lo que es casi lo mismo, Grecia debería comenzar a imprimir su propia divisa de manera inmediata. La decisión del BCE, en realidad la tomarían los Jefes de de Estado Europeos, y las consecuencias en caídas de PIBs en toda Europa serían proporcionales al desorden con el que se produzca el proceso.
Lo más peliagudo estaría aún por llegar, y el BCE debería imprimir un QE1 europeo de dimensiones gigantescas a modo de cortafuegos ante el colapso del sistema financiero español e italiano. En fin, mejor os dejo con el texto original, que aunque no deja de ser un intento adivinatorio, al menos parte de una visión bastante realista de la situación de colapso inminente actual. En definitiva, nada que no hayamos previsto quienes decidimos tomar la píldora roja allá por aquellas lejanas Navidades de 2008
Como artículos relacionados os dejo etse par:
Os dejo con el texto del artículo de JPMorgan, calentito, calentito:
Until recently, we assessed the likelihood of a Greek exit from the monetary union as moderate, perhaps in the region
of 20%. This partly reflected a judgement that Greecewould be better placed to make its fiscal and structural adjustments
within the monetary union rather than outside it. However, it has also been clear that an exit would require
two conditions: for a Greek government to reject the terms of the EU/IMF program and for the rest of the region to take a
hard line in any renegotiation process. Recent developments suggest that both of these conditions may now be
falling into place. The next election in Greece could well result in a government led by Syriza, which might not only
completely reject the terms of the second EU/IMF program, but also seek to unwind some elements of the first program.
Meanwhile, policymakers in the rest of the region have made it clear that this would not be acceptable. They believe
that a Greek exit can now be managed due to the firewalls that have been put in place over the past year. Thus, in our
view, the likelihood of a Greek exit has risen to around 50%. A path to an exit It is now relatively easy to see what the path to a Greek exit could look like. The next election on June 17th leads to a government dominated by Syriza. This new government
repudiates the second EU/IMF program in its entirety and states that it will unwind some elements of the first program.
The Troika decides to withhold any further disbursements from the second program and in response, the Greek government
declares a moratorium on all debt payments and nationalizes the banks. Significant deposit flight takes place
that is impossible to manage because the ECB will no longer accept Greek sovereign debt as collateral. The Greek government
pressures the Greek central bank to use the ELA to finance both the sovereign and the banks, against the wishes
of the ECB in Frankfurt (if the banks are nationalized they could buy new government debt and use it as collateral in the
ELA). In order to prevent the Greek central bank from behaving in this way, payments to and from Greek entities are shut
out of the Target2 system. This would be tantamount to Greece being ejected from the monetary union. The Greek
government would impose capital controls and start theprocess of creating a new currency.
Although it is now possible to imagine this path, there are two additional considerations. First, deposit flight out of
Greece could greatly accelerate the pressure in the system, forcing policymakers to take decisions more quickly than
they might ideally like. And second, there is likely to be considerable negotiation between a new Greek government
and the rest of the region. Syriza doesn’t want to leave the monetary union, and the rest of the region would like Greece
to remain. The key issue is whether there are terms of continued EMU membership that are acceptable to both sides.
There will be an attempt to reach a compromise, which is possible if both sides are willing to concede some ground.
Thus, the likelihood of a Greek exit under a Syriza-led governmentis high, but it is not 100%.
Although policymakers in the Euro area are saying that it is up to the Greeks to decide whether they want to stay in the
monetary union or not, the scenario described above indicates that the deciding issue will be central bank financing
for Greek banks and the Greek sovereign. Shutting Greece out of Target2 is not a decision that the ECB would make
alone: ultimately it would be a political decision made by the heads of state of the Euro area.
The impact on Greece A Greek exit from the Euro area would initially impact the economy through a number of channels. The banking system’s ability to supply credit would be severely impaired as it was restructured. The logistics of getting new physical
cash into place would be a challenge, disrupting the ability to make domestic payments for several months. Uncertainty
over the exact legal boundaries of contracts redenominated from euros would likely persist for years. The acceptability
of the newly introduced currency in international trade would likely be limited initially, which could prompt rationing
of essential imports such as food, energy, and medicine. As the new currency declined—it could easily fall 50%—
inflation would spike, and the real value of wages and priprivate savings would fall sharply. A sharp drop in output,and significant effects on income distribution, would place further strain on the political and civil order. Greece’s relationship
with the EU, including its access to trade and structural adjustment funds, would need to be renegotiated.
It seems likely that a Greek exit would depress GDP by 5- 10%-pts more than would happen were Greece to stay in the
Euro area. This would put the peak to trough decline in Greek GDP at 25-30%, broadly matching the US experience
in the early 1930s. How quickly the Greek economy would recover subsequently is both uncertain and controversial.
Many cite post-devaluation experiences elsewhere as evidence that inflation can be controlled, and with a large depreciation
in the real exchange rate secured, vigorous growth can return quickly. We are less optimistic on that
score. Greek trade unions retain a significant ability to protect real incomes despite high unemployment, political outcomes
are increasingly unpredictable, and we doubt that euro exit would be a spur to structural reform.
The impact on the rest of the region A Greek exit would involve broad-based defaults in Greece
by the government, banks, and nonfinancial corporates.
With the new currency likely to drop sharply, it would not be possible to repay liabilities in euros or other currencies.
As far as the rest of the region is concerned, this would likely be disruptive but much less than it would have been
two years ago. Greek government debt has already been restructured, and there has been a significant substitution
of official liabilities both for government debt (in the two EU/IMF programs) and for bank debt (in Target2).
If the direct effects of default were the only thing to worry about, a Greek exit would be manageable as far as the rest
of the region is concerned. The really serious risk comes from contagion to other peripheral economies, which
would put both sovereigns and banks under pressure. The macro impact of contagion would depend on the ex ante
financial market and capital outflow pressure and the speed and magnitude of the policy response.
It is hard to know how great the pressure would be, but it seems likely that the area-wide policy response would need
to be quick and substantial. Indeed, given that contagion pressure would build even before a formal exit, Euro area
policymakers would need to respond early in the process. The ECB is in the position to act the fastest, lending to peripheral
banks not only to an unlimited extent but also on a virtually uncollateralized basis (for example, against government
guaranteed bank bonds). Politicians in the region will also have to respond: shared resources would need to beprovided for area-wide deposit guarantees and for bank recapitalization. Even given these steps, Spain and Italy are
likely to lose capital market access. The ECB would need to be willing to lend to the ESM (by buying ESM-issued
debt) in order to provide the resources to support them. The €500 billion ceiling on new ESM operations would also
likely need to be raised. These measures might be enough to contain capital flight from peripheral banks; if not, then
capital controls would need to be reintroduced. Some of these measures would need to go through a political approval
process, which would take at least some time. It is hard to gauge exactly what would happen to area-wide
GDP in the event of a Greek exit because we would be deeply into uncharted waters, but there would likely be a
significant impact. A reasonable view would be that the level of GDP would be hit by an additional 2%-pts relative
to our current forecast. This would put the current downturn in line with previous deep recessions, such as the mid-
1970s and the early 1990s, but milder than the exceptionally deep recession of 2008-09, when areawide GDP fell 5.5%
from peak to trough.
In addition to a rapid and substantial policy response intended to contain contagion, a Greek exit would likely
force the region to engage further regarding the question of how to design a robust institutional structure to ensure the
stability of the monetary union into the medium term. Even though much has taken place on the governance side since
this crisis began, there has not been a meaningful erosion of national sovereignty. It seems likely that this needs to take
place in order to ensure EMU’s long term survival. What happens if Greece stays? There is a 50% likelihood that Greece stays inside the monetary union. As long as the next Greek government does notreject the program in its entirety, the rest of the region is likely to concede a huge amount of ground on the pace of adjustment. Indeed, there is already talk about additional growth-enhancing measures being offered to Greece. While Greece remaining in the monetary union removes the nearterm disruption that would be caused by an exit, it risks undermining the whole governance structure in the medium term. We have long been worried that conditionality is virtually meaningless, due to the lack of political will to impose effective sanctions. Developments in Greece in the coming months will determine whether or not that is actually true. If Greece is allowed to significantly renegotiate the EU/IMF
program, it seems likely that Portugal and Ireland will demand the same concessions, and it seems likely to undermine
the reform effort in Spain and Italy.